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THE POSITION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WITHIN THE
INDONESIAN LEGAL SYSTEM
Simon Butt∗
ABSTRACT
Indonesia’s role in international and regional affairs has increased
markedly since the fall of Soeharto in 1998. It has, for example, signed many
international treaties. However, Indonesian law is silent on the position of
international law, whether treaty or custom, in Indonesia’s legal system. This
has led to a significant unresolved legal debate about whether Indonesia
follows monism or dualism. This Article argues that, while Indonesia appears
to be dualist in practice, there is some evidence of monism, particularly in the
decisions of Indonesia’s Constitutional and Supreme Courts. Regardless, the
uncertainty has allowed the Indonesian government to, on the one hand, leave
the international community to believe that ratified treaties have automatic
application, but on the other hand, to refuse to grant any rights to citizens that
those international treaties seek to provide, claiming that treaties have no
domestic application until incorporated by an Indonesian legal instrument.
INTRODUCTION
Indonesia, the world’s fourth most populous country, is an important player
in international and regional affairs. Indonesia has signed and ratified many
international agreements1 and is expected to soon ratify more, including the
∗

Associate Professor and Associate Director (Indonesia) of the Centre for Asian and Pacific Law at
Sydney Law School, Universidty of Sydney. All translations are my own. I thank Professor Ben Saul for
comments on an earlier version of this article, and Diana Hu, Fritz Siregar and Arjuna Dibley for their research
assistance. I acknowledge the Australian Research Council (projects DPI095541 and DP110104287) and
Sydney Law School for funding this research.
1 These include the key human rights treaties, such as Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20,
1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, S. TREATY DOC. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY. DOC. No. 95-19, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (1978);
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195;
Convention on the Political Rights of Women, Mar. 31, 1953, 193 U.N.T.S. 135. Indonesia is also party to
various International Labour Organisation (“ILO”) and other international organization sponsored conventions.
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Rome Statute.2 By 2013, Indonesia had served three terms on the United
Nations Human Rights Council and in 2011 chaired the Association of SouthEast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”). Indonesia’s international position is likely to
become only more prominent. Largely unaffected by the recent global financial
crisis, Indonesia’s economy has grown by more than six percent per annum
since 2010 and, by some estimates, could become the world’s fourth largest by
2040.3
Many commentators have criticised Indonesia for failing to comply with
international agreements it has ratified, including some concerning human
rights4 and international trade.5 In this Article, I focus on one issue that appears
to impede this compliance: the absence of domestic Indonesian legal rules
specifying the way that international law, once ratified, enters into force in the
Indonesian legal system.
Of course, state sovereignty demands that nations decide how international
legal obligations and rights are received into their own domestic legal systems,
and “what status and rank in the hierarchy of municipal sources of law to
assign to [them].”6 Different states have adopted different methods depending
See Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, June 25, 1958, ILO
C111; Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3; Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3; International
Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220
U.N.T.S. 3; Convention Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, June 26, 1973, ILO C138.
2 Bagus BT Saragih & Margareth S. Aritonang, RI to Ratify Rome Statute, JAKARTA POST, Mar. 6, 2013,
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/03/06/ri-ratify-rome-statute.html; Rep. of the Working Grp. on the
Universal Periodic Review: Indonesia, U.N. Human Rights Council, May 21, 2012‒June 4, 2012, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/21/7 12, 21st Sess. at 12 (2012).
3 Hugh White, Indonesia and Australia: The Great Power Next Door, E. ASIA F. (July 8, 2012), http://
www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/07/08/indonesia-and-australia-the-great-power-next-door/ (last visited Oct 10,
2013).
4 See generally ANYA JETSCHKE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATE SECURITY: INDONESIA AND THE
PHILIPPINES (2011); Luke Lazarus Arnold, Acting Locally, Thinking Globally ? The Relationship between
Decentralization in Indonesia and International Human Rights, 2 J. E. ASIA & INT’L L. 177 (2009) ; Nicola
Colbran, Realities and Challenges in Realising Freedom of Religion or Belief in Indonesia, 14 INT’L J. HUM.
RTS. 678 (2010); Philip Eldridge, Human Rights in Post-Soeharto Indonesia, 9 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 127
(2001).
5 HIKMAHANTO JUWANA, TREATY MAKING—INDONESIAN PRACTICE 6–7 (2005), available at http://
www.cdi.anu.edu.au/CDIwebsite_19982004/indonesia/indonesia_downloads/2005%2007%20Indo%20Hikma
hanto%20paper.pdf; Simon Butt, Intellectual Property Law in Indonesia: A Problematic Legal Transplant, in
INDONESIA: LAW AND SOCIETY 620 (Tim Lindsey ed., 2nd ed. 2008); Simon Butt & Tim Lindsey, Intellectual
Property, Civil Law and the Failure of Law in Indonesia: Can Criminal Enforcement of Economic Law Work
in Developing Countries?, in LAW REFORM IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL STATES 391 (Tim Lindsey ed.,
2007).
6 ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 15 (1986).
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on the source of international law in question.7 For example, some states
provide that, once ratified, international agreements override domestic law to
the extent of any inconsistency.8 Others deny legal effect to international
agreements until they are “transformed” into domestic law.9 Yet others allow
so-called “self-executing” treaties to be automatically applied.10 Many
countries, but not all, allow customary international law to automatically
operate in their domestic legal systems.11 The courts of many countries have
adopted presumptions that domestic lawmakers intend to comply with
international treaties and custom when making domestic laws.12 Some of these
courts have then had resort to sources of international law to aid them in the
interpretation and application of their domestic constitutions and other laws.13
Perhaps uniquely, Indonesia appears to have made no explicit choice about
how international law enters domestic law. This is a fundamental problem
because, as Cassese states:
International law cannot stand on its own feet without its “crutches”,
that is . . . international law cannot work without the constant help,
co-operation, and support of national legal systems. As the German
jurist, H. Triepel, observed in 1923, international law is like a field
marshal who can only give orders to generals. It is solely through the
generals that his orders can reach the troops. If the generals do not
14
transmit them to the soldiers in the field, he will lose the battle.

Indonesian laws covering international agreements focus almost entirely on the
processes of entering into and negotiating treaties. Indonesia’s Constitution, for
example, is silent on the status of international law within the Indonesian legal
system. Its only reference to international agreements is found in Article 11,
which states, in my translation:
(1) The President, with the approval of the National Parliament,
declares war and peace and creates agreements with other nations.

7 Dinah Shelton, Introduction to INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS:
INCORPORATION, TRANSFORMATION, AND PERSUASION 1 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2011).
8 Id. at 10.
9 Id.
10 See GILLIAN D TRIGGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONTEMPORARY PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 11–13
(2nd ed. 2011).
11 Id. at 13.
12 Shelton, supra note 7, at 18.
13 Id. at 19–20.
14 CASSESE, supra note 6, at 15.
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(2) When creating international agreements that give rise to
consequences that are broad and fundamental to the life of the
people, create financial burdens for the State and/or require
amendments to legislation or the enactment of new legislation, the
President must obtain the agreement of the National Parliament.
(3) Further provisions on international agreements are to be regulated
by statute.15
Likewise, Indonesia’s Law on International Agreements, enacted in 2000,
determines who can negotiate and sign treaties on Indonesia’s behalf, and how
treaties are ratified under Indonesian law.16
This Article aims to identify and describe the relationship between
international law and domestic law within the Indonesian legal system. Given
the regulatory lacuna just described, I examine two additional legal mediums
that appear to illuminate the relationship. The first is academic literature,
known as doktrin, or “doctrine.” Doctrine is more influential on the work of
lawyers and judges in many civil law countries, such as Indonesia, than in
common law countries, with the work of some highly-respected legal scholars
considered as a source of law.17 Part I highlights scholarly debates about
whether Indonesia follows “monism,” where international law automatically
forms part of domestic law, or “dualism,” where international law does not
form part of domestic law until it is transformed or implemented in domestic
law, such as by passage of legislation or another type of regulation. Most
Indonesian scholars have focused almost exclusively on the position of treaties,
15

UNDANG UNDANG DASAR NEGARA REPUBLIK INDONESIA [CONSTITUTION] art. 11.
Law No. 24 of 2000 (Indon.). Prior to this statute, the only additional guidance on the ratification of
treaties was provided, rather unusually, in a letter by Indonesia’s first President, Soekarno, addressed to the
Parliamentary Chairperson, entitled “Creating Agreements with Other Countries.” Bagir Manan, Kekuasaan
Presiden Dalam Masalah dan Hubungan Internasional, 1 MAJALAH PADJADJARAN (1985).The letter declared
that, in the opinion of the government, Article 11 of the Constitution did not apply to all types of agreements
with foreign states. Id. Rather, the letter sought to confine the meaning of “agreements” to only “the most
important (terpenting) agreements” concerning political issues that could affect alliances and state territory;
important economic issues, technical assistance or finance; or matters that must be regulated by statute under
Indonesian law. Id. As for all other types of international agreements, the National Parliament would be simply
informed of them after they had been entered into. Id. The letter explained that if the government was required
to seek prior parliamentary approval for all agreements, however trifling their subject matter, the government
would be unable to properly engage in international relations. Id. This, the letter continued, would impede the
conduct of international relations, which often required swift action. Id. Despite its questionable legal status,
the letter was considered valid and was largely followed.
17 Gary Bell, The Importance of Private Law Doctrine in Indonesia, in INDONESIA: LAW AND SOCIETY,
363 (Tim Lindsey ed., 2nd ed. 2008).
16
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ignoring other importance sources of international law such as custom. As we
shall see, most Indonesian scholars conclude that Indonesia is dualist, at least
in respect of treaties, observing that many ratified international treaties lie
dormant and unenforceable until they are transformed into domestic law by
statute or regulation. I reach a different, albeit tentative, conclusion, arguing
that Indonesia may well be monist, at least at law. Whether incorporation is
necessary is likely a practical rather than legal matter, and depends on the
nature of the international agreement and the types of rights and obligations it
imposes. There has, in the literature, emerged no discussion about the extent to
which international law can or should be used by courts to interpret Indonesian
law.
The second source I examine in this Article is the jurisprudence of
Indonesia’s highest courts. In several decisions, discussed in Part II of this
article, Indonesia’s Supreme and Constitutional Courts have either directly
applied or been strongly influenced by international law. Although I argue that
these decisions appear indicative of monism, my analysis is, again, tentative.
As I demonstrate below, the Supreme and Constitutional Courts’ use of
international law has been inconsistent. Also, like most civil law countries,
Indonesia lacks a formal system of precedent. These decisions and the
approaches the courts take to international law in them are therefore neither
sources of law nor formally binding as they might be in common law
countries.
Whatever the true position of international law is within Indonesian
domestic law, the result in Indonesia is significant uncertainty and confusion
about whether rules contained in international treaties ratified by Indonesia
automatically form part of Indonesian law. This has serious ramifications,
some of which I consider in my conclusion.
I. DOCTRINE
Indonesian scholarly discourse about the position of international law
within the Indonesian legal system is undeveloped—leading one scholar to
urge others academics to turn their attention to this issue.18 Many Indonesian
international law texts have chapters entitled “international law and domestic
law” or something similar, but most of them, like the Constitution and the Law

18 DJENAL SIDIK SURAPUTRA, HUKUM INTERNASIONAL DAN BERBAGAI PERMASALAHANNYA: SUATU
KUMPULAN KARANGAN 229 (2004).
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on International Agreements mentioned above, focus on the technical aspects
of treaty-making, including negotiation, acceptance, signature, exchange of
documents, ratification, accession and reservation19 Many also outline monism
and dualism and the differences between them, but only some then consider
which of these prevails in Indonesia.20 Again, although Indonesian scholars
distinguish between the various sources of international law in other chapters
of their texts, they tend to focus exclusively on how treaties enter Indonesian
law, ignoring the other sources, such as custom.
Most authors point to two grounds indicating that Indonesia is fully or
partially monist. The first is the work of Professor Mochtar Kusumaatmadja.
Formerly Dean of the Faculty of Law at University of Padjadjaran in Bandung,
Indonesian Justice Minister (1973-78), and Indonesian Foreign Minister (197883), Kusumaatmadja is a prominent and widely-respected proponent of
monism and the lead author of Indonesia’s foremost international law text,
Pengantar Hukum Internasional (Introduction to International Law), which is
prescribed for international law classes in many Indonesian law schools.21
Kusumaatmadja observes that, while most countries specify the position of
international law in their domestic laws or even their constitutions, Indonesia
does not.22 However, Kusumaatmadja argues that this does not necessarily
mean that international law is inferior to domestic law in Indonesia.23 Pointing
to Indonesia’s continental European legal heritage, he concludes that Indonesia
is monist.24 Even in the absence of formal ratification or implementing

19 SUNARYATI HARTONO, ANALISIS DAN EVALUASI HUKUM TENTANG RATIFIKASI PERJANJIAN
INTERNASIONAL DI BIDANG HAK ASASI MANUSIA DAN URGENSINYA BAGI INDONESIA (2000); WAYAN
PARTHIANA, BEBERAPA MASALAH DALAM HUKUM INTERNASIONAL DAN HUKUM NASIONAL INDONESIA 128
(1987).
20 See BOER MAUNA, HUKUM INTERNASIONAL: PENGERTIAN, PERANAN DAN FUNGSI DALAM ERA
DINAMIKA GLOBAL 50 (2000); SEFRIANI, HUKUM INTERNASIONAL: SUATU PENGANTAR 86 (2nd ed. 2011);
ROMLI ATMASASMITA, PENGANTAR HUKUM PIDANA INTERNASIONAL 97 (Ed. 2. ed. 2000); Damos Dumoli
Agusman, Status Hukum Perjanjian Internasional Dalam Hukum Nasional RI Tinjauan Dari Perspektif
Praktik Indonesia, 5 INDONES. J. INT’L L. 488 (2007).
21 MOCHTAR KUSUMAATMADJA & ETTY R AGOES, PENGANTAR HUKUM INTERNASIONAL (2003).
Kusumaatmadja sole-authored the first edition in 1976. See Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, TOKOH INDON.
www.tokohindonesia.com (last accessed May 1, 2014); Prof. Dr. Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, KEPUSTAKAAN
PRESIDEN-PRESIDEN, http://kepustakaan-presiden.pnri.go.id/cabinet_personnel/popup_profil_pejabat.php?id=
293&presiden_id=2&presiden=suh (last accessed May 1, 2014)
22 KUSUMAATMADJA & AGOES, supra note 21, at 88‒89.
23 Id.
24 Id at 92.
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regulations, he states: “[W]e should consider ourselves bound by treaties and
conventions approved (disahkan) by Indonesia.”25
Kusumaatmadja’s influence in legal circles should not be underestimated.
Damos Dumoli Agusman, who served as Director of Economic and SocialCultural Treaties at the Foreign Affairs Ministry from 2006 to 2010, was
involved in early deliberations on the Draft Law on International Agreements,
which ultimately became Law No. 24 of 2000, discussed above.26 According to
Agusman, Law No. 24 did not seek to clarify the status of international treaties
ratified by Indonesia within domestic law because drafters and the Indonesian
Foreign Ministry assumed that Indonesia was monist, following
Kusumaatmadja’s views.27
The second indication of monism to which many scholars point is a
Supreme Court Directive issued in 2006, in which the Court applied the 1961
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (“Vienna Convention”).28 The
Vienna Convention had been formally ratified by Indonesia’s National
Parliament through Law No. 1 of 1982, but the Convention’s provisions had
not yet been transformed into national law. Yet in its Directive, the Indonesian
Supreme Court applied the diplomatic community principle in Article 31 of the
Convention to a domestic land dispute involving the Saudi Arabian embassy in
Indonesia.29
Agusman, whose work provides perhaps the most detailed examination of
whether Indonesia follows monism or dualism, lists additional indications of
monism.30 First, he points to Article 13 of the International Agreements Law,
which stipulates that every statute or presidential regulation that ratifies an

25

Id.
DAMOS DUMOLI AGUSMAN, HUKUM PERJANJIAN INTERNASIONAL: KAJIAN TEORI DAN PRAKTIK
INDONESIA 104 (2010). See generally Agusman, supra note 20.
27 AGUSMAN, supra note 26, at 104; Agusman, supra note 20, at 490. However, there appears to be more
uncertainty within government than Agusman suggests. In the ASEAN Charter Case the government even
called an expert, Dr Wisnu Aryo Dewanto, to give an opinion about whether treaties ratified in Indonesia
automatically became part of Indonesian law and could be applied by national courts. Witness Testimony,
Reviewing Law 38 of 2008 on the Ratification of the Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations,
PERKARA NO. 33/ PUU-IX/2011, at 4–11 (Constitutional Court, Aug. 23, 2011), available at http://www.
mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/Risalah/risalah_sidang_Perkara%20No.%2033.PUU-IX.2011,%20tgl.%2023%20
Agustus%202011.pdf. His testimony—that Indonesia is dualist, at least as a matter of practice—appears to be
the dominant scholarly view, discussed below. Id.
28 Agusman, supra note 20, at 492.
29 Id.
30 AGUSMAN, supra note 26, at 39; Agusman, supra note 20, at 490.
26
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international agreement must be published in the State Gazette.31 The
Elucidation to Article 13 states that: “[T]he placement of the laws that ratify an
international agreement in the State Gazette is intended so that everyone can
know about agreements made by the government and binding all Indonesian
citizens.”32
Second, Agusman points to Article 7 of Law Number 39 of 1999 on
Human Rights, which states that:
(1) Every person has the right to use all national legal avenues and
international fora in respect of all breaches of human rights, the
protection of which is guaranteed by Indonesian and international
human rights law that has been received (diterima) by the Republic
of Indonesia.
(2) Provisions of international law that relate to human rights, and that
have been received by the Republic of Indonesia, become national
law.33
Third, Agusman mentions the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Case, in
which the Constitutional Court refers to “practice and universal customary
international law” in coming to its decision.34
These three indicators are hardly convincing arguments for monism. The
Elucidation to Article 13 of the International Agreement Law is not clearly
expressed. Importantly, it does not say that a treaty itself becomes binding by
the inclusion of its ratifying law in the State Gazette. Rather, it appears to
merely require publication of ratified treaties. On my reading, Article 7 of the
Human Rights Law in fact appears to indicate that Indonesia usually follows
dualism. If Indonesia followed monism, then there would be no need to
specifically prescribe that international human rights received by Indonesia
become part of national law.35 Finally, the Constitutional Court did not give

31

Agusman, supra note 20, at 490 (citing Law No. 24 of 2000, art. 13).
Law No. 24 of 2000, art. 13. All Indonesian statutes and many other types of laws have official
elucidations (penjelasan). Although they are not formally part of the law they purport to elucidate, in practice,
they are usually treated as providing determinative interpretations of the statute’s main text.
33 Law No. 39 of 1999, art. 7.
34 Decision, Reviewing Law 27 of 2004 on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Truth and
Reconciliation Case), PERKARA NO. 006/PUU-IV/2006, at 122 (Constitutional Court, Dec. 4, 2006).
35 Similarly, Article 26 of the 1999 Law on International Relations states that asylum is to be granted to
foreigners in accordance with national laws after considering international law, custom and practice. Law No.
32
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independent authority to a rule of international law in the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission Case. Rather, the Court referred to international
norms to support its own interpretation of Indonesian law. The Court
commonly uses international law in this way—an issue to which I return
below.
Given the paucity of evidence for monism provided in the literature, it is
unsurprising that most Indonesian scholars conclude that Indonesia is dualist.
Many of these scholars refer to two examples to support this conclusion. The
first is the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(“UNCLOS”).36 Indonesia’s Parliament formally ratified the Convention by
Law No. 17 of 1985.37 However, this ratification did not disturb Law No. 4 of
1960 on Indonesian Waters, which remained in force for more than ten years
after the ratification.38 Only when Law No. 6 of 1996 was enacted to
implement UNCLOS was Law No. 4 of 1960 finally replaced.39
The second example is the entry-into-force of the 1958 New York
Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.40
This was ratified by Presidential Decree in 1981.41 However, the Supreme
Court refused to apply the Convention to enforce foreign arbitral awards in
Indonesia—including in a famous 1984 case42—until its Chief Justice issued a
Supreme Court Regulation in 1990, which permitted judges to enforce foreign
awards and established procedures for them to follow.43
From these examples, scholars have extrapolated principles along the
following lines: Ratification of a treaty will, in itself, be insufficient to render

37 of 1999 on International Relations, art. 26. Again, if Indonesia followed monism, Article 26 would be
superfluous.
36 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, December 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
37 Law No. 17 of 1985.
38 Law No. 4 of 1960.
39 SARI AZIZ & RANYTA YUSRAN, INDONESIA & RANYTA YUSRAN FOR CIL RESEARCH PROJECT ON
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME CRIMES 10 (2011) (“It was law No. 6/1996 (the implementing legislation of
UNCLOS), and not Law No. 17 of 1985 (instrument of ratification of UNCLOS) which replaced Law No. 4 of
1960 on Indonesian Waters..”).
40 Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T.
2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
41 Presidential Decree No. 34 of 1981 (Indon.).
42 Decision, No. 294K/Pdt/1983 (Supreme Court, Aug. 20, 1984).
43 Supreme Court Regulation Number 1/1990. See AZIZ AND YUSRAN, supra note 39, at 10 (citing
SUDARGO GAUTAMA, HUKUM DAGANG DAN ARBITRASE INTERNASIONAL (2001)); AK Syahmin, HUKUM
KONTRAK INTERNASIONAL 186 (2006).
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an international agreement enforceable in Indonesia. At a minimum, the
treaty’s principles, rights and obligations—or perhaps even a translation of the
treaty provisions themselves—need to be included in an Indonesian domestic
law.44 Importantly, however, these scholars base their conclusion that
Indonesia is dualist entirely on an examination of practice. There appears to be
less discussion, let alone agreement, about whether the evidence of dualist
practice means that Indonesia is also dualist in theory, or at law, with most
scholars simply not making the distinction.45 Few observe, for example, that
international law is not mentioned on Indonesia’s hierarchy of laws,46 which
seems to imply that it is not formally recognised as expected in a monist
system.47
In my view, it is at least arguable that Indonesia is at least partly monist as
a matter of law. Given there are no rules about the operation of international
law within Indonesian domestic law, reference should be had to the Dutch law
applicable at the time of Indonesia’s independence, declared on August 17,
1945. Indonesia’s Constitution declares that all existing laws and institutions
remained in force, until they are replaced by laws and institutions made by the
independent state.48 Indonesia thereby inherited Dutch laws and institutions,
and even the civil law tradition. The Netherlands is well-known for being at
least “moderately monistic,” since the beginning of the twentieth century.49
44 Professor Hikmahanto Juwana provides, as an example, the entry of the Capetown Convention on
International Interests in Mobile Equipment into Indonesian law. HIKMAHANTO JUWANA, HUKUM
INTERNASIONAL DALAM PERSPEKTIF INDONESIA SEBAGAI NEGARA BERKEMBANG 97–98 (2010). Juwana
explains that after the Convention was ratified, there was debate over whether the Convention could be applied
directly without transformation by way of implementing regulation. Id. To end that debate, Indonesia’s
Aviation Law of 1999 was replaced in 2009. Id. Articles 71 through 82 of the 2009 Law sought to transform
the Convention into Indonesian law, but according to Juwana, this was flawed. Id. Details of the Convention
were lost in the translation. Id. Also, aspects of the Convention should have been reflected in amendments to
other Indonesian statutes. Id. For example, provisions on bankruptcy inserted into the 2009 Law were
inconsistent with Indonesia’s Bankruptcy Law. Id. This resulted in uncertainty because judges needed to
decide whether to apply the Aviation Law or the Bankruptcy Law when airlines became bankrupt. Id.
45 For a variety of views, see id. at 74–76; SS ADMAWIRIA, PENGANTAR HUKUM INTERNASIONAL 1, 135
(1966); MAUNA, supra note 20, at 13; HARTONO, supra note 19, at 16.
46 The “hierarchy of laws” is a list of types of laws within the Indonesian legal system indicating their
relative authority. Law No. 12 of 2011 on Law-Making, art 7(1) (listing the hierarchy of laws).
47 See AGUSMAN, supra note 20.
48 Constitution of 1945, Transitional Provisions, Part II; Government Regulation No. 2 of 1945.
49 FV Hoof, The Impact of International Law in the Legal Order of the Netherlands: The Role of the
Judiciary, in COURTS OF FINAL JURISDICTION: THE MASON COURT IN AUSTRALIA 195–96 (Cheryl Saunders
ed., 1996); E. A. Alkema, International Law in Domestic Systems, 14 ELECTRON. J. COMP. LAW 1 (2010)
(“[T]he Netherlands system has been qualified as “moderately monistic”). See Indische Staatsregeling
Algemeene Maatregelen van Bestuur [General Regulations of Governance] art. 91(1a), reprinted in G
KARTASAPOETRA & RG KARTAPUTRA, INDONESIA DALAM LINGKARAN HUKUM INTERNASIONAL (DARI ABAD

BUTT GALLEYSPROOFS3

2014]

8/6/2014 9:18 AM

THE POSITION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

11

How then to explain that many, if not most, international treaties need to be
replicated in an Indonesian law in order to be applied and domestically
enforced? Much appears to depend on the nature of the international
agreement. On one hand, if an international agreement introduces new legal
concepts or contradicts pre-existing Indonesian law, then most police,
prosecutors, public servants and even judges will not usually apply them
directly without “transformation.” There are various possible practical
explanations for this disinclination which I do not examine in this Article,
including lack of knowledge about the agreement, politics, budgetary
limitations, lack of initiative and bureaucratic insularity. Many of the treaties
falling into this category are multilateral and well-known, at least amongst
Indonesia’s legal community, and failure to implement them often leads to
calls for the government to issue domestic implementing laws. On the other
hand, treaties with more specific and detailed subject matter are, in fact, likely
to be routinely followed by those to whom they pertain as if they were binding,
particularly if there is no relevant contradictory Indonesian law. Many of these
are bilateral and largely uncontroversial, and their existence and application
garner relatively little public attention. They are very rarely called upon to be
enforced by courts, as occurred in the case involving the Saudi Arabian
embassy.50
It is quite possible, then, that treaties ratified by Indonesia might become
formally binding under Indonesian law but will, as a practical matter, lie
dormant until their principles are “picked up” in a domestic law. This approach
appears to be consistent with the view of Kusumaatmadja, which is expressed
later in his book but often ignored by other Indonesian scholars. He admits that
even though the international agreements that Indonesia has signed are
formally binding, if those agreements require changes to domestic law, they
will often go unheeded by officials until those changes are made.51
Kusumaatmadja accepts that “enactment is absolutely necessary if, for
example, it requires changes to national statutes that directly touch on the
rights of citizens as individuals.”52 He reasons that new laws or amendments
will be required if, for example, international law creates offences not
previously known in Indonesian criminal law.53
ABAD) 13 (1984)); see also Henry Schermers, Netherlands, in 7 THE EFFECT
LAW 109 (Francis Jacobs & Shelly Roberts eds., 1987).
50 See text accompanying supra note 28–29.
51 KUSUMAATMADJA & AGOES, supra note 21, at 94.
52 Id.
53 Id.
KE
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Kusumaatmadja also maintains that:
[Implementation in domestic law] is not very necessary if the issue
[about which the treaty relates] does not affect many people or if the
issue is very technical and its scope is limited. Examples of such
treaties or conventions are the Convention on the Law of Treaties, the
Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the ICAO Convention. In
the event of inconsistency between domestic law (that has not yet
been amended) for judges or the relevant person, the only criterion
[to determine] whether a state is bound or not, is whether the
54
agreement legally binds us or not.

Another well-known Indonesian legal scholar, Professor Saudargo
Gautama, appears to take a similar view, arguing in the following passage that
the Supreme Court should have applied the New York Convention in the 1984
case55 even before implementing regulations were issued:
[S]ome Indonesian laws require formal implementing regulations as a
condition precedent to their effectiveness, but it is not normally the
case with respect to the treaties to which Indonesia has adhered,
especially not with regard to the New York Convention 1958 which
has been expressly adhered to by Presidential Decree 1981 No 34. No
implementing rules have indeed been enacted so far and therefore the
procedure how to request for enforcement in Indonesia of foreign
arbitral awards may not be entirely clear. However, the New York
Convention itself has regulated in Art. III that . . . “each contracting
State shall recognise arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in
accordance with the rules of procedure in the territory where the
award is relied upon, under conditions laid down in the following
articles. There shall not be imposed substantially more onerous
conditions or higher fees or charges on the recognition or
enforcement of arbitral awards to which this convention applies that
are imposed on the recognition or enforcement of domestic arbitral
awards . . . The enforcement has to be effected in the same manner as
56
execution of domestic arbitral awards.”

II. INDONESIAN JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Supporting the argument that Indonesia follows monism, or a variation of
it, is the scope that some Indonesian courts have given to international law in

54
55
56

Id. at 93–94.
Decision, No. 294K/Pdt/1983 (Supreme Court, Aug. 20, 1984); see text accompanying notes 40–43.
SUDARGO GAUTAMA, INDONESIAN BUSINESS LAW 479–80 (1995).
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their decision-making. The Indonesian Supreme Court—the final court of
appeal, or cassation, for most types of disputes in Indonesia57—has directly
enforced international law in at least two reported cases.58 The Constitutional
Court, which has powers of constitutional review,59 makes regular reference to
international law in its decisions. Although, to my knowledge, the
Constitutional Court has not used international law as a source of law
independent of domestic sources, it has in some cases, treated international law
as a highly persuasive guide when interpreting provisions of Indonesia’s
Constitution. In this way, the Constitutional Court has allowed international
law to permeate Indonesian law.
A. The Supreme Court
In addition to the Vienna Convention case mentioned above, the Indonesian
Supreme Court appears to have applied international law in the Landslide
case.60 This case began in the District Court of Bandung in 2003.61 The
applicants were victims of a landslide in West Java.62 They filed a class action
against Perhutani (a state-owned forestry company) arguing that the forest area
had been mismanaged, causing the landslide; and against the government,
arguing that the government failed to monitor Perhutani’s activities.63 The
defendants’ response was that a natural disaster had caused the landslide.64
Presented with conflicting testimony, the lower court found that there was
scientific uncertainty about the landslide’s exact cause.65 To resolve the case,
the court resorted to the precautionary principle adopted in Principle 15 of the
Rio Declaration, acknowledging that the principle had not yet been adopted in

57 Simon Butt & Tim Lindsey, Judicial Mafia: The Courts and State Illegality in Indonesia, in THE
STATE AND ILLEGALITY IN INDONESIA 189 (G Van Klinken & Edward Aspinall eds., 2010). See generally
Simon Butt & Tim Lindsey, Unfinished Business: Law Reform, Governance and the Courts in Post-Soeharto
Indonesia, in INDONESIA, ISLAM AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION (Mirjam Kunkler & Alfred Stepan eds.,
2013).
58 There may well be more examples, but the Supreme Court has published only a small portion of its
decisions.
59 TIMOTHY LINDSEY & SIMON BUTT, THE INDONESIAN CONSTITUTION: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 107–
28 (2012).
60 Andri Wibisana, The Development of the Precautionary Principle in International and in Indonesian
Environmental Law, 14 (2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2131666 (last visited Oct 10, 2013); Dedi
v
Perhutani, 1794K/Pdt/2004 (Supreme Court of Indonesia, 2007).
61 Wibisana, supra note 60, at 17.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.

BUTT GALLEYSPROOFS3

14

8/6/2014 9:18 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

Indonesian environmental law.66 The court found the defendants strictly liable
and ordered them to pay compensation. An appeal by the government to the
provincial High Court was rejected.67
The government appealed to the Supreme Court in Jakarta.68 One ground
for appeal was that the lower courts had been wrong to apply the precautionary
principle because the Indonesian government had not ratified the Rio
Declaration, and the precautionary principle had not been adopted in
Indonesian law.69
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that:
[T]he [lower court] judges did not erroneously apply the law by
adopting rules of international law. The application of the
precautionary principle in environmental law was to fill a legal
vacuum . . . the view of the cassation applicant that Article 1365 of
the Civil Code could be applied in this case cannot be justified
because the enforcement of environmental law is to be performed by
the standards of international law. National judges can use rules of
70
international law if they view it as jus cogens.

The Supreme Court’s reference to “a legal vacuum” in the above passage is
likely a reference to a provision contained in the numerous “Judiciary Laws”
(Undang-undang Pokok Kekuasaan Kehakiman) since at least 1970.71 Article
10 of Indonesia’s Judiciary Law of 2009 is the current iteration.72 It prohibits
courts from “refusing to examine, adjudicate and decide cases brought before
them on the basis that the law does not exist or is not clear. Rather, [they are]
required to examine and adjudicate them.”73 If no Indonesian law applies to a
dispute before a judge, this provision appears to provide an avenue through
which he or she could apply international law directly to the case.

66

Id.; see Law No. 23 of 1997 on Environmental Management.
Id.
68 Id.
69 Dedi v Perhutani, 1794K/Pdt/2004 (Supreme Court of Indonesia, 2007).
70 Id. at 85. Indonesia’s lower courts have also sought to apply international law, but in limited
circumstances. Wibisana, supra note 60 (citing Wiwiek Awiati v Minister of Agriculture (District
Administrative Court of Jakarta Decision 71/G.TUN/2001/PTUN-JKT, 2001) (applying the precautionary
principle in lower courts); Wiwiek Awiati v Minister of Agriculture (Administrative Court of Appeals of
Jakarta Decision 120/2001/Bd.071/G.TUN/2001/PTTUN-JKT, 2002) (applying the precautionary principle in
lower courts)).
71 See, eg., Law No. 14 of 1970; Law No. 4 of 2004.
72 Law No. 48 of 2009, art. 10.
73 Id.
67
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B. The Constitutional Court
The Constitutional Court has referred to international law in many of its
judicial review decisions. However, to my knowledge, in its decisions the
Constitutional Court has explained neither the circumstances in which it will
use international law, nor how it will use international law principles. In the
following discussion, I seek to demonstrate that the Constitutional Court has
used international law primarily to help it interpret the Indonesian Constitution
and Indonesian laws. However, the weight the Constitutional Court has given
to international law appears to be inconsistent from case to case, and the
Constitutional Court has not yet explained these inconsistencies.
I have discerned three approaches to international law in the Constitutional
Court’s decisions. The first—the weak-use approach—sees the Constitutional
Court refusing to use international law as a reference point, and ignoring or
dismissing out-of-hand arguments based on international law from the
parties.74 This approach is encapsulated in the statements of former Justice
Roestandi, who warned against over-reliance on international law in several
dissents. Although political and international law developments might be
relevant in some cases, he emphasised that the Constitution was the highest
source of validity for statutes and trumps international law.75 As Roestandi
wrote extramurally, “[m]y task as a constitutional court judge is to review the
constitutionality of a statute as against the Constitution, not to review the
Constitution against international law.”76
In some of these cases, the Constitutional Court has explicitly rejected
international norms, even though the Court may have, in fact, been influenced

74 See, e.g., Decision, Reviewing Law 30 of 2002 on the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK Law
Case) at 25–26 (Constitutional Court 37-39/PUU/VIII/2010); Decision, Reviewing Law 44 of 2008 on
Pornography (Pornography Law Case) at 136–37 (Constitutional Court 10-17-23/PUU-VI/2009). See Diana
Zhang, The Use and Misuse of Foreign Materials by the Indonesian Constitutional Court: A Study of
Constitutional Court Decisions 2003‒2008 (2010) (unpublished M.A. thesis, The University of Melbourne)
(on file with The University of Melbourne), for an excellent analysis of the Constitutional Court’s use of
foreign legal materials, including international law.
75 Achmad Roestandi, Mengapa saya Mengajukan Dissenting Opinion, in MENJAGA DENYUT
KONSTITUSI: REFLEXI SATU TAHUN MAHKAMAH KONSTITUSI, 51 (Refly Harun, ZAM Husein, & Bisariyadi
eds., 2004); Decision, Reviewing Law 26 of 2000 on the Human Rights Court (Soares case), at 63‒64
(Constitutional Court 065/2004); Decision, Reviewing Law 12 of 2003 on General Elections for Members of
the DPR, DPD and DPRD (PKI case), at 40–41 (Constitutional Court 011-017/2003).
76 Roestandi, supra note, at 51.
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by them. In the Children’s Court Law Case,77 for example, the applicants
raised several international law arguments78 to challenge the validity of several
provisions that made the age of criminal culpability eight years old for some
offenses.79 In its decision, the Court lifted that age to twelve, which was in line
with the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child.80 However, the Court
emphasised that in adopting this as the age of criminal responsibility, it was
not using the “these instruments and recommendations . . . [as] a gauge to
assess the constitutionality of the age of responsibility for children.”81 Similar
sentiments were expressed by Arief Hidayat, who was appointed to the Court
in 2013. During his “fit and proper” test before the National Parliament, he
said that “Indonesia should implement human rights appropriate to the “local
context” instead of unconditionally appointing the standards of the United
Nations.”82
The Constitutional Court’s second approach gives more credence to
international law, but attributes no real influence to it. Under this approach, the
Court refers to international law, but only to support a decision the Court
seems to have already arrived at, based on an interpretation of the Constitution
and Indonesian law that the Court claims as its own.
The third approach sees the Court relying quite heavily on international
legal principles and interpretations from international bodies to help it construe
the Indonesian Constitution, the statute being reviewed in the case, or both.83
This approach is well-expressed by one judge in a case involving employment
rights: “[I]n order to understand the right to work” in the Constitution, “it is
best to carefully study” various rights in international labour conventions.84
What appears to distinguish this category of use from the second approach is

77 Decision, Reviewing Law No. 3 of 1997 on Children’s Courts (Children’s Court Law Case)
(Constitutional Court 1/PUU-VIII/2010).
78 For an example, see id. at 26–27.
79 Id. at 9‒10.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 151.
82 Ina Parlina, Minorities wary of Mixed Signals From Court, JAKARTA POST, (May 3, 2013), http://
www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/05/03/minorities-wary-mixed-signals-court.html.
83 For examples of cases in which the Constitutional Court extensively refers to international treaties, see
Decision, Reviewing Law 7 of 2004 on Water Resources (Water Resources Law case), at 486 (Constitutional
Court 058-059-060-063/PUU-II/2004); Decision, Reviewing Law 23 of 2003 on General Election of President
and Vice President (Abdurrahman Wahid Case) (Constitutional Court No. 008/PUU-II/2004).
84 Decision, Reviewing Law 39 of 2004 on Placement and Protection of Indonesian Overseas Workers
(Overseas Workers case No. 1) (Constitutional Court 019-020/PUU-III-2005, (citing ICCPR, supra note 1, art.
2; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, December 10, 1948 UNGA Res 217 A(III) Art 2.
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that the Court might not have arrived at its decision without using international
law.85
What follows are selected case examples of the Court’s use of international
law in interpretation—that is, of the second and third approaches. As we will
see, the Court sometimes uses both approaches in the same case.
1. Discrimination Cases
The Constitutional Court has used international law as a reference point in
several discrimination cases.86 Some of these cases have involved challenges to
statutes preventing particular categories of citizens from standing for
election.87 Perhaps the most famous was the Abdurrahman Wahid Case in
2004.88 In this case, former Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid, along
with several others, challenged the constitutional validity of Article 6(1) of the
2003 Election Law, which required candidates to be “spiritually and physically
capable of performing the duties and responsibilities of President or Vice
President.”89 The applicants argued that this was discriminatory and thus
breached several constitutional provisions, including Article 27(1), which
grants all citizens the right to equality before the law, a right that the
government must protect “without exception.”90 The applicants also argued
that Article 6(1) breached Indonesia’s international obligations under the
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), which
Indonesia had ratified.91 Article 25 of the ICCPR states: “Every citizen shall
have the right and opportunity . . . [t]o take part in the conduct of public

85 Worryingly, however, in some important cases, the Court appears to have misunderstood the
international law it used to interpret the Constitution, leading to outcomes that might perplex some
international lawyers.
86 See, eg, Decision, Reviewing Law 32 of 2002 on Broadcasting (Broadcasting Law Case), at 82
(Constitutional Court 005/PUU-I-2003).
87 Decision, PKI case; Decision, Reviewing Law 27 of 2007 on National Oil and Gas (Migas Law case)
(Constitutional Court Decision 016/PUU-V-2007); Decision, Reviewing Law 12 of 2003 on General Elections
for the National Parliament, Regional Representative Council and Regional Parliament (Election Law case No
1), at 79, 82 (Constitutional Court Decision 016/PUU-V-2007); Decision, reviewing Law 10 of 2008 on
General Elections for the National Parliament, Regional Representative Council and Regional Parliament
(Election Law Case No. 2), 129‒30 (Constitutional Court Decision 003/PUU-VII-2009) (citing ICCPR, supra
note 1).
88 Decision, Abdurrahman Wahid Case.
89 Law No. 23 of 2003 on Presidential and Vice Presidential Elections, art 6.
90 Decision, Abdurrahman Wahid Case, at 6.
91 ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 25.
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affairs . . . and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage,” without unreasonable restrictions.92
The Court observed that the applicants should have referred to Article 2 of
the ICCPR, which contains various prohibited grounds for discrimination.93
However, the Court found that Article 6(1) of the 2003 Election Law did not in
fact discriminate on any of these grounds.94 Instead, the Court identified the
1975 Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons as the international
instrument most relevant to the case at hand. Article 4 of the Declaration,
which the Court sets out, states:
Disabled persons have the same civil and political rights as other
human beings; paragraph 7 of the Declaration on the Rights of
Mentally Retarded Persons applies to any possible limitation or
suppression of those rights for mentally disabled persons.95

Article 7 of the 1971 Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons
states:
Whenever mentally retarded persons are unable, because of the
severity of their handicap, to exercise all their rights in a meaningful
way or it should become necessary to restrict or deny some or all of
these rights, the procedure used for that restriction or denial of rights
must contain proper legal safeguard against every form of abuse
(emphasis in original Court citation).96

The Court’s reference to these Declarations was problematic. Quite apart from
the fact that they are non-binding resolutions of the UN General Assembly, the
Court did not explain why it used Article 7 of the latter Declaration, which
applies to “mentally retarded persons,” to interpret the much broader phrase
“spiritual and physical capability” used in Article 6(1) of the impugned law.97

Decision, Abdurrahman Wahid Case, at 6‒7.
These prohibited grounds include “race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” ICCPR supra note 1, art 2.
94 Decision, Abdurrahman Wahid Case, at 11.
95 Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons, G.A. Res. 3447 (XXX), art. 6, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/30/3447 (Dec. 9, 1975).
96 Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, G.A. Res. 2856 (XXVI), art. 7, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/2856(XXVI) (Dec. 20, 1971).
97 Decision, Abdurrahman Wahid Case, at 11. In any event, Abdurrahman Wahid suffered from physical,
not mental, health problems.
92
93
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The Court also referred to Article 21(1) of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (“UDHR”).98 Article 21(1) establishes the right to take part in
the government of one’s country, either directly or through freely chosen
representatives.99 Though the Court noted that the UDHR’s principles were
internationally accepted,100 it emphasised that Indonesian law provided the
same protections:
[T]he principles mentioned in Article 21 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights are general principles accepted by the international
community . . . . [B]ecause Indonesia is part of the international
community, it implicitly recognises these principles in the Preamble,
Part IV of the Constitution, and explicitly mentions them in Chapter
101
XA, Articles 27(1) and 28D(3) of the Constitution.

Similarly, in the Indonesian Overseas Workers Case,102 the applicants
argued that the statute under review was discriminatory because it only
provided various protections to Indonesian workers abroad who were at least
21 years old. The majority of the Court ultimately rejected this application.
However, when determining what constituted discrimination under the
Constitution, the majority set out Article 1(3) of the 1999 Human Rights Law
which, the Court noted, contained a definition of discrimination similarly to
that contained in Article 2 of the ICCPR.103 The Court then referred to a
European Community Council Directive,104 which sets out examples of
differential treatment on the basis of age that do not constitute
discrimination.105

98

Id. at 8–9.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 84, art 21(1).
100 Decision, Abdurrahman Wahid Case, at 26–27.
101 Id. at 27.
102 Decision, Reviewing Law 39 of 2004 on Placement and Protection of Indonesian Overseas Workers
(Overseas Workers Case No. 2) (Constitutional Court Decision 028-029/PUU-IV 2006).
103 Article 1(3) of Law 39 of 1999 on Human Rights establishes the grounds of discrimination as
“religion, ethnicity, race, group, faction, social status, economic status, sex, language, or political belief.” Law
No. 39 of 1999 on Human Rights, art. 1(3).
104 Council Directive 2007/78/EC of 27 of November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal
treatment in employment and occupation (adopted 27 November 2000, entered into force 2 December 2000)
303 OJ L 16.
105 Decision, Overseas Workers Case No. 2, at 60; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, supra note 1; International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of Crime of
Apartheid, November 30, 1973, 1015 UNTS 243. In another case, the issue was the constitutionality of
provisions which required addictive substances, including tobacco, to meet minimum quality standards for
health reasons. Decision, Reviewing Law 36 of 2009 on Health (Health Law Case) (Constitutional Court No.
19/PUU-VIII-2010) One argument made by the applicants was that this provision was discriminatory. Id. The
99
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2. Absolute Rights Cases
The Court has also cited various international agreements, such as the
UDHR, ICCPR, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, to support the argument that constitutional rights can be
limited in some circumstances—such as to maintain public order, or the
dignity or honour of an individual. Most commonly, the Court cites Article
19(3) of the ICCPR,106 noting its similarity to Article 28J(2) of the
Constitution, which permits constitutional rights being limited by legislation
directed at:
protecting the rights and freedoms of others and which accords with
moral considerations, religious values, security and public order in a
democratic society.107

The Court has also upheld statutes that appear to breach apparently nonderogable constitutional rights contained in Article 28I(1) of the Constitution,
which states:
The right to life, the right to not be tortured, the right to freedom of
thought and conscience, the right to religion, the right to not be
enslaved, the right to be recognised as an individual before the law,
and the right to not be prosecuted under a law of retrospective
application are human rights that cannot be limited under any
circumstances.108

In these cases, a majority of the Court has decided that Article 28I(1) rights can
be limited or nullified by reference to Article 28J(2). The Court has justified
doing this by referring to international law despite the plain words of the
Constitution—particularly “cannot be limited under any circumstances.”

Court referred to various international legal sources to show that only legal subjects, and not objects such as
tobacco, enjoyed freedom from discrimination. Id.
106 Article 19(3) of the ICCPR states:
The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties
and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be
such as are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or morals.
ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 19(3)
107 Decision, Reviewing Law 36 of 2009 on Health (Health Law Case) (Constitutional Court No.
19/PUU-VIII-2010).
108 Id. (emphasis added).
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In the Bali Bombing Case, for example, the applicant, Abdul Kadir, had
been convicted in Indonesia’s general courts of involvement in the 2002 Bali
Bombings and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment under an anti-terrorism law
that was enacted after the bombings took place.109 He argued that a separate
law that purported to permit this anti-terrorism law, to be applied
retrospectively to pursue him and other perpetrators, breached his
constitutional right to freedom in Article 28(1) from prosecution under a
retrospective law.110
By a majority of five judges to four, the Court decided that the statute was
unconstitutional.111 In coming to this conclusion, the majority attributed
significant weight to the words “cannot be limited under any circumstances” in
Article 28I(1).112 The majority also referred to provisions of international
human rights conventions that supported the prohibition on retrospectivity.113
Both the majority and the minority, who would have allowed retrospective
prosecution because of the seriousness of the case, also cited provisions of
international conventions and examples of the retrospective laws being applied
by international tribunals. From these conventions and examples, the majority
reasoned:
[T]he essence of the principle of non-retroactivity is to protect against
the criminalisation of an act that was not considered a crime when the
act was perpetrated . . . Also prohibited are new laws which stipulate
a harsher penalty or punishment than the penalty or punishment
applicable at the time the act was committed . . . [Retrospective
legislation is justified provided that] it does not violate the two
114
prohibitions mentioned above.

109 For background and further references, see Simon Butt & David Hansell, The Masykur Abdul Kadir
Case: Indonesian Constitutional Court Decision No 013/PUU-I/2003, 6 AUST. J. ASIAN L. 1 (2004).
110 Id.
111 Id. at 176.
112 Decision, Reviewing Law 16 of 2003 on the Stipulation of Interim Law 2 of 2002 about the
Application of Interim Law 1 of 2002 on the Eradication of the Crime of Terrorism in the Bali Bombings of 12
October 2002 as a Statute (Bali Bombing case), 36–37 (Constitutional Court No. 013/PUU-I/2003).
113 Id. (citing Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 84, art 11(2); European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom, art 7, November 4, 1950, 213 UNTS 222
[hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights]; ICCPR, supra note 1, arts 4, 15; American Convention
on Human Rights, art 9, November, 22 1969, 1144 UNTS 143; Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court arts. 22‒24, July 17, 1998, 2187 UNTS 3).
114 Id. at 53.
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In another case about freedom from retrospectivity, Abilio Jose Osorio
Soares, the former Governor of East Timor, sought constitutional review of
Article 43(1) of Law 26 of 2000 on the Human Rights Court.115 Under this
provision, proceedings in the Human Rights Court had been initiated against
him for human rights abuses in East Timor in 1999. Article 43(1) states:
“[G]ross violations of human rights which occurred before this Law is enacted
[can] be heard and adjudicated by the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court.”116
In this case, a majority of the Court found that Article 28I(1) rights were
not absolute in all circumstances. Those rights must be read alongside Article
28J(2), which allows exceptions to “satisfy just demands in accordance with
moral considerations, religious norms, security and public order.”117 The
majority decided that Article 43(1) could be applied to pursue “gross violations
of human rights,” defined under Article 7 of the Human Rights Court Law as
genocide and crimes against humanity.118
The majority appeared concerned to justify this decision by reference to
international law. As it had in Bali Bombing, the majority set out Articles 11(2)
and 15 of the ICCPR which, they decided, prohibit laws of retrospective
operation only if the act in question was not a crime under national or
international law—or the general principles of law recognised by the
community of nations—at the time the act was committed.119 The Court also
mentioned the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda. Both Tribunals were established to prosecute alleged crimes after the
alleged crime had taken place. This was justifiable under international law
because the alleged crimes were illegal at the time they were allegedly
committed.120
Another case involving an Article 28I(1) right was brought by five
applicants sentenced to death for drug offences.121 They argued that the
provisions of Indonesia’s Narcotics Law, under which they had been
115

See generally Decision, Soares Case.
Law No. 26 of 2000, art. 43(1).
117 Decision, Soares Case, at 56.
118 Id.
119 The Court also referred to Article 4 of the ICCPR, which allows the state to derogate from its
obligations under the Convention during public emergencies, provided that it does not contravene international
law, involve discrimination. or contravene the European Convention on Human Rights. See ICCPR, supra note
1, art. 4; Decision, Bali Bombing case, at 53, 66; Decision, Soares case, supra note 75 at 57.
120 Decision, Soares Case, at 58.
121 Decision, Reviewing Law 22 of 1997 (Death Penalty Case) (Constitutional Court No. 2-3/PUV/2007).
116
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sentenced, violated the right to life provided in Articles 28A and 28I(1) of the
Constitution, and breached Indonesia’s ICCPR obligations.122
A majority of the Court rejected the challenge, making various arguments
based on international law. The majority pointed to Article 46 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties which, the Court held, prohibits states from
failing to comply with a treaty because the treaty breaches national law, unless
the breach “concerned a rule of . . . internal law of fundamental importance.”123
The Court opined that Indonesia could, therefore, contravene the ICCPR by
imposing the death penalty for drug offences if this was of “fundamental
importance” to Indonesia.124
In any event, the Court reasoned that Indonesia had not breached the
ICCPR, which allows the death penalty for the “most serious crimes.”125 The
Court decided that these crimes included drug offences, particularly those
described in the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances, which Indonesia had ratified by enacting the
1997 Narcotics Law.126 According to the Court, both “particularly serious”
crimes referred to in the Narcotics Convention and “most serious crimes”
under the ICCPR affected the “economic, cultural and political foundations of
society” and carried “danger[s] of incalculable gravity.”127 Imposing the death
penalty for such crimes was, therefore, not only permissible under the
ICCPR—in the Court’s view, it was in fact implicitly sanctioned by the
Narcotics Convention, which encouraged member states to take strong action
against drug traffickers.128
The Court’s interpretation of “most serious crimes” to include drug
offences appears to contradict the view of the UN Human Rights Committee:
122
123

Law No. 22 of 1997.
Article 46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states in full:
(1)

(2)

A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been
expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude
treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule
of its internal law of fundamental importance.
A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State conducting itself in
the matter in accordance with normal practice and in good faith.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 46, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
124 Decision, Death Penalty case, at 420.
125 ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 6(2).
126 Decision, Death Penalty case, at 420.
127 Id.
128 Id.
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that the death penalty is “a quite exceptional measure” and that “most serious
crimes” encompass only the most exceptional circumstances.129 While
intentional killing, infliction of grievous bodily harm, or acts that create grave
danger which may result in death or irreparable harm might fall within this
category,130 the Committee seems to prefer the view that drug-related offences
will generally not.131
3. ASEAN Charter Case
Finally, I turn to discuss the ASEAN Charter Case, decided on February 4,
2013.132 This was a much-anticipated case, with some scholars hoping that the
Constitutional Court would seek, in its decision, to clarify the position of
international law within the Indonesian legal system.133 The applicants—a
coalition of NGOs—sought a review of Law No. 38 of 2008 on the
Ratification of the ASEAN Charter (“Law 38”).134 The Law comprises two
provisions. Article 1 declares that the national parliament ratifies the ASEAN
Charter, the original English-language version of which is appended to the
statute along with an Indonesian translation.135 Article 1 also states that the
Charter is “an inseparable part of this statute.”136 Article 2 simply states that
the statute comes into force on the date of its enactment and orders that it be
published in the State Gazette.137

129 U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 06: Article 6 (The Right to Life), (Apr. 30, 1982)
reprinted in U.N., International Human Rights Instruments, at 176, 177, U.N. Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I)
(May 27, 2008), http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=HRI%2f
GEN%2f1%2fRev.9%20(Vol.%20I)&Lang=en.
130 SARAH JOSEPH, JENNY SCHULTZ & MELISSA CASTAN, INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY 120 (2004); Lubuto v Zambia, U.N. Human Rights
Comm., 55th Sess., para 7.2, Commc’n No. 390/1990, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/55/D/390/1990 Annex.
131 In T v Australia, for example, the dissent by committee members Eckart Klein and David Kretzmer
found that deporting the accused to Malaysia (where he could face the mandatory death penalty for possessing
more than 15 grams of heroin) was in breach of the Article 6 obligations. T v Australia, U.N. Human Rights
Comm., 61st Sess., para 6, Commc’n No. 706/1996, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/61/D/706/1996 Annex. The majority
disagreed on the facts, finding insufficient evidence that Malaysia intended to prosecute the accused, thus the
death penalty was not a foreseeable consequence of deportation. Id para 8.6.
132 Decision, Reviewing Law 38 of 2008 on the Ratification of the ASEAN Charter (Asian Charter case).
(Constitutional Court 33/PUU-IX/2011).
133 Damos Dumoli Agusman, Apakah MK Bisa Menguji Piagam ASEAN?, ANTARA, July 25, 2011.
134 Decision, Reviewing Law 38 of 2008 on the Ratification of the ASEAN Charter (Asian Charter case).
(Constitutional Court 33/PUU-IX/2011).
135 Law No. 38 of 2008, art. 1.
136 Id.
137 Id. art. 2.
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The applicants did not ask the Court to invalidate either of these two
provisions. Rather, they challenged Articles 1(5) and 2(2)(n) of the ASEAN
Charter itself. Article 1(5) states that one purpose of ASEAN is to establish a
“single market and production base” with “free flow of goods, services and
investment” and “freer flow of capital.”138 Article 2(2)(n) binds ASEAN
members to multilateral trade rules and to move towards eliminating market
barriers to regional economic integration in a “market-driven economy.”139
The applicants pointed out that, partly on the basis of these provisions,
various ASEAN free trade agreements had been entered into, such as the
ASEAN-China, the ASEAN-Australia and the ASEAN-Korean Free Trade
Agreements. However, the applicants argued that free trade was unfair to
Indonesians whose ability to compete was weak, such as small scale
businesses, and would damage domestic industries. This, they argued,
breached constitutional protections in Article 27(2)140 and Article 33.141
A seven-to-two judge majority of the Court decided that Articles 1(5) and
2(2)(n) of the Charter did not breach the Constitution. According to the
majority, neither Article 1(5) nor Article 2(2)(n) bound the state to do anything
more than enact national laws to give effect to the agreement and left the state
with latitude to choose how to comply with it. In any event, the Charter had not
come into force when Law 38 was enacted because other ASEAN countries
had not yet ratified it, as required by the Charter.142
According to the government, the applicant’s challenge to Articles 1(5) and
2(2)(n) of the Charter presupposed that Law 38 brought the Charter into force
within the Indonesian domestic legal system. However, the government
emphasised during case hearings, no rule of Indonesian law states that
ratification statutes also transform rules of international treaties into national
law. In Indonesia, the government continued, the norms of an international
agreement can be effectively implemented at the national level only after they
are transformed by a national law.

138 Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations art. 1(5), Nov. 11, 2007, 2624 U.N.T.S. 223
[hereinafter ASEAN Charter].
139 Id. art. 2(2).
140 Id. art. 27(2) (“Every citizen has the right to employment and a livelihood befitting a human being”).
141 Id. art 33 (“The economy is a ‘collective endeavour based on the family principle’ and the state must
control important branches of industry and natural resources for the ‘greatest prosperity of the people”).
142 ASEAN Charter case, supra note 132, at 196.
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The majority did not directly address the government’s argument. Rather, it
merely stated that the Charter “took the form of a statute, that is Law 38/2008,
as its vessel” and that the statute ‘applies as a legal norm’ because it binds its
subjects—in this case, the state.143 However, because the state had not yet
implemented its obligations under the Charter, no constitutional rights had
been breached.
It might be argued that simply by considering the merits of the case—that
is, whether Articles 1(5) and 2(2)(n) were constitutional—the majority
implicitly accepted that ratification by statute constitutes transformation into
that statute. If this were not so, then the majority could not, legally, have
reviewed provisions of the Charter directly. This is because, as mentioned, the
Court lacks jurisdiction to review anything but statutes as against the
Constitution. If the majority did not consider that the Charter had, by virtue of
Law 38, the status of a statute, then it should have refused to hear the case.144
Instead, as mentioned, the majority held that the ratifying statute bound the
state to the Charter. It appears, then, that the majority in the ASEAN Charter
Case added nothing to the wider debate about how international law enters the
domestic legal system. An Indonesian ratification instrument arguably already
binds the state internationally—hence the need for presidential and
parliamentary endorsement. Even though ratification binds the state to the
Charter, it does not necessarily follow that the ratification statute brings the
143 It was on jurisdictional grounds that the two dissenting judges declared that they would have rejected
the application. In separate judgements, Justices Hamdan Zoleva and Maria Farida distinguished between
general statutes and states that ratified international agreements. Id. at 199, 202. For them, the Constitutional
Court’s jurisdiction did not extend to reviewing ratifying statutes because even though ‘formally’ they were
statutes, in substance they were not. Id. They both pointed out that a general statute undergoes a process of
deliberation and revision, but a ratification statute only adopts the norms agreed to in the treaty. Id. The
national parliament and government cannot amend the treaty unless the treaty itself allows for this. Id. They
also observed that a general statute is directly applicable to every person in Indonesia, whereas an international
agreement only binds the state and other countries that sign it. Id.
144 This “transformation argument,” if correct, raises significant questions. One is that if Law 38
transformed the ASEAN Charter into a national statute, then it would have come into force before the ASEAN
Charter itself. Law 38 came into force on the date of its enactment November 6, 2008, whereas the Charter
came into force thirty days after ten ASEAN states ratified it, which eventually occurred on December 15,
2008. Another issue is that, as mentioned above, many types of treaties can also be ratified by presidential
decree. If the ratification of a treaty transforms that treaty into Indonesian law, then does that treaty have the
same legal authority or weight as the ratifying law? In other words, does a treaty ratified by presidential decree
have the same weight as a presidential decree in the Indonesian legal system, and does a treaty ratified by
statute have the same weight as a statute? Because presidential decrees formally have a lower status than
statutes in the Indonesian legal hierarchy, does this mean that the national parliament could, therefore, override
a treaty ratified by presidential decree, regardless of that treaty’s importance? The Constitutional Court’s
decision provides no answers to these questions.
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Charter “into” Indonesian domestic law so that it becomes an instrument
enforceable in Indonesian courts.
CONCLUSION
While there remains much uncertainty, reasons exist to suggest that
Indonesia might be formally monist, at least in part. Some treaties appear to be
automatically applied, particularly bilateral treaties that concern specific
matters on which Indonesia pledges to co-operate. Also, some Indonesian
courts appear amenable to international law, though its use has been primarily
as an aid to interpretation in constitutional cases. In the available cases, the
Supreme Court has used international law only as an aid to fill in gaps in
Indonesian law, not to override it.
Despite this, the system appears to be primarily dualist in practice: many
government officials will not act on international norms until they are
transformed into Indonesian law. The result is that Indonesia does not in fact
comply with many treaties until domestic laws are issued to bring those treaties
into effect. The “lag” between ratification and transformation can be many
months or even years, given Indonesia’s notoriously slow law-making
processes. Some treaty obligations have simply not been complied with at
all.145 Even though in some ways Indonesia’s system might appear to follow
“self-executing treaty” distinction that is commonly associated with the United
States,146 the government and the courts have provided no guidance on how the
system should or does work. The result of all this appears to be significant
uncertainty about the effect of ratification of any given treaty.
This uncertainty is, in fact, to the great advantage of the Indonesian
government. To the international community, it can claim that ratification will
automatically bring treaties into domestic Indonesian law. If challenged,
Indonesian officials—some no doubt with genuinely-held belief—can point to
Kusumaatmadja and Indonesia’s Dutch legal heritage. This makes deflecting
international criticism for non-compliance much easier than if Indonesia was
openly dualist.
Indonesia’s UN Universal Periodic Review in 2012 was a case in point. In
its assessment of Indonesia’s progress on human rights, the Human Rights
Council complemented Indonesia on its ratification of the Convention on the
145
146

Juwana, supra note 5.
TRIGGS, supra note 10, at 123.
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Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the International Convention on the
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. It also praised
Indonesia for submitting bills to its National Parliament on the ratification of
two Optional Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child; for being
in the process of ratifying the International Convention for the Protection of
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance; and for considering the ratification
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Of course, as I have
argued, ratification of most of these agreements will have little or no effect in
Indonesia because they require significant amendments to Indonesian law and
will, therefore, most likely lie dormant until transformed. Only a handful of
States involved in the Periodic Review urged Indonesia to enact domestic laws
to implement these and other international agreements.
Domestically, the uncertainty about the effect of ratified treaties allows the
government to avoid obligations under international treaties it has ratified—by
simply declaring that a further step of transformation is required before those
obligations can be enforced against it in Indonesia. The government might not
take that step for many years, if at all, for a variety of reasons, including
politics or economics.147 This leaves citizens and others in Indonesia
vulnerable to the deprivation of rights that international treaties seek to
provide.
In the face of this doctrinal and practical uncertainty, one thing does seem
clear: Given the convenience this uncertainty brings to the Indonesian
government, there is little incentive for legislative or constitutional change to
clarify the status of international law within the Indonesian legal system any
time soon.

147

Juwana, supra note 5.

